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Abstract 
SAF/IG implemented the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) in 2013 following a 
USAFE pilot study into its potential for implementation across the Air Force. Using responsive 
constructive evaluation and content analysis of interviews as a methodology, AFIS was 
evaluated against the objectives laid out in AFPAD13-01. 18 interviews were conducted on 4 
stakeholder groups across the inspection enterprise, which resulted in 4 overarching themes: 
Culture Shifts, Self-Assessment, Higher Headquarters Relationships, and PAD Objectives. This 
research allows SAF/IG to implement changes to future versions of AFIS that incorporates views 
from the field.  
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EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM 
I. Introduction
Overview 
Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) implemented the Air Force 
Inspection System (AFIS) in 2013 following a USAFE pilot study into its potential for 
implementation across the Air Force. According to Air Force Program Action Directive 13-
01 (AFPAD13-01):  
“The Inspector General (TIG) completed a comprehensive assessment of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the AF Inspection System. TIG found the system to be 
wasteful, inadequate and unsustainable in the current and future resource 
environment. Over time, AF organizations had created over 100 inspections requiring 
350+ inspection days over a 5-year span for most wings. These inspections—80% by 
AF Functionals, 20% by IG—were often done with inadequate cross-tell, resulting in 
an unsustainable burden on inspectors and inspected units. In addition, TIG found the 
system was not providing the kind of AF-wide unit performance data desired by AF 
senior leaders. The current system also does not fully meet Title 10 requirements for 
commanders and IGs to inspect and report on the efficiency, economy, state of 
discipline, and readiness of AF units.”  
As a result of this, SAF/IG implemented AFIS as a means to correct these deficiencies. This 
program was designed to be a cultural change about getting Airmen to identify our problem 
areas so that we can work on them collectively (Mueller, 2013).   
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 The intent of this research effort is to evaluate the program based on the objectives 
laid out in AFPAD13-01. In the 4 years since implementation, the prevailing culture in the 
Air Force to “embrace the red” (meaning to accept that there are deficiencies within our 
programs that will not be instantly corrected) has had effects on operations, it benefits the Air 
Force to determine what those effects have been.  
Background 
In 2012, Lt Gen Rogers, SAF/IG, declared that the current Air Force Inspection System 
was unsustainable. “Given budget constraints, reduced manning, and increased taskings, 
headquarters and wings will not have the money, personnel, or time to execute the current 
system. And, we cannot solve our wings’ white-space problems simply by creatively 
scheduling/organizing external inspections to reduce their duration and frequency; we must 
fundamentally change the system.” (Rogers, 2012) 
The 2010 governing guidance for inspector general activities spelled out broad categories 
of inspections including: Limited Inspections, Federal Recognition Inspections, Biological Select 
Agents and Toxins Inspections, Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel (NWRM) Inspections, 
Wounded Ill, and Injured (WII) Facility Inspections, FAM Evaluations and Assessments, Self-
Inspections, Compliance Inspections (CI), Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI), Nuclear 
Surety Inspections (NSI), Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections (NORI), Health Services 
Inspections (HSI), Field Inspections, Inspector General Directed Investigations (IGDI), and 
several other forms of audits (SAF/IGI, 2009). Within these broader categories of inspections 
and activities, smaller inspections, audits, and staff assistance visits would occur as well.  
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The burden of finding manning to conduct all these inspections, the cost of conducting all 
of these inspections, and the workload on the wings due to all of these inspections led the Chief 
of Staff of the Air Force in June of 2010 to direct all inspection agencies to map the current AF 
inspection system with emphasis on identifying primary consumers of wing “whitespace”. 
Whitespace was defined as time available to the wing not being consumed by other parties by 
means of inspections, visits, or HHQ exercises. There was also an attempt to reemphasize and 
reinvigorate the role of Gatekeepers, and develop and implement actions to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the entire AF inspection system (Paris, 2011). 
A Tiger Team was established and determined that the typical wing experiences 500+ 
days of inspection related activities over a 5 year period of time and left no “whitespace” to try to 
improve operations or train personnel in problem areas. Based on this finding, the Tiger Team 
determined that all inspections would need to be routed through the IG at the wing (or 
equivalent) level in order to deconflict the immense workload placed on units and inspectors, 
with the exception of inspections that have by-law requirements to be conducted by non-IG 
personnel.  
 Further, this team identified that coordination of the self-inspection data would be better 
served by consolidating the multitude of self-generated spreadsheets floating around into a 
system of record that could be analyzed at the MAJCOM/HAF level. MICT was realigned to 
provide units in AF Reserve Command (AFRC) with a means to quickly determine what 
checklists applied to each unit, what roles and responsibilities were needed, and the overall 
process to follow (Craig, 2013). This system allows multiple personnel in each unit access to 
populate the same checklist, provide input and feedback until the information is approved and 
locked by a supervisor (Mejia, 2011). 
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 The most important piece of AFIS, however is the Commander’s Inspection Program 
(CCIP) and Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) construct. The CCIP is composed of 2 pieces—a 
wing-level inspection program and a self-assessment program (Figure 1). The self-inspection 
program exists to provide the unit commander the capability to improve their unit where the 
rubber meets the road. Any deficiencies should be detected and reported into MICT at the local 
level. Waivers to requirements can be requested and approved at the appropriate level within 
MICT. Further, as life in the squadron is fluid, so should their current state of compliance as 
reporting is a continuous process. The wing level inspection program exists to assist commanders 
in validating their self-assessment programs (HQ USAF, 2013).  
 
Figure 1 – Commanders Inspection Program (HQ USAF, 2013) 
 The UEI was a significant change in focus for MAJCOM IGs and MAJCOM staffs. The 
UEI validates and verifies a Wing’s CCIP and offers the MAJCOM Commander an independent 
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assessment of the unit in 4 major graded areas: Executing the Mission, Improving the Unit, 
Managing Resources, and Leading People (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 – AFIS Major Graded Areas (MGA) and Sub-MGAs (HQ USAF, 2013) 
These UEIs would also be conducted in a rotating manner, in order to reduce the overall 
footprint needed for inspection AF-wide with a 24-30 month inspection cycle for Active-Duty 
and AFRC Wings and a 48-60 month inspection cycle for ANG Wings. AFRC Wings will be 
inspected by HQ AFRC and gaining MAJCOM IGs on a 48-60 month cycle. This results in a 
UEI every 24-30 months based on a rotational schedule between AFRC and the gaining 
MAJCOM (HQ USAF, 2013).  
Thanks to the use of virtual tools such as MICT and IGEMS, inspections could be 
continuous and further reduce the size of the inspection foot print. A continual evaluation period 
is used to build a “photo-album” of a Wing’s performance throughout the inspection cycle. 
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Virtual inspections, MAJCOM FAM inputs, Wing* CC’s Inspection Reports (CCIR), MICT 
data, Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) data, and small-team on-site 
visits are just some of the inspection methods which are used (Figure 3). A MAJCOM IG-
administered survey of each inspected Wing is conducted and included in the Leading People 
MGA. Finally, an on-site, capstone visit during which the MAJCOM IG conducts focus groups, 
interviews, task evaluations, audits and observations to complete the UEI (HQ USAF, 2013). 
 
Figure 3 – MAJCOM IG's UEI Flow (HQ USAF, 2013) 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to identify to what extent the changes that the Air 
Force has made targeted the problems it initially identified. Further, it seeks to determine 
what shortfalls remain and potentially identify fixes to fill those shortfalls. This has been a 
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dramatic change in mindset that we’ve asked Airmen to make, with emotions involved in 
some cases. This change has its benefits and its costs. Four years after implementation, it is 
time to decide how well the program has achieved its objectives.  
 
Research Question and Investigative Questions 
The research question to be answered is “How has the Air Force Inspection System succeeded in 
achieving desired Program Action Directive objectives?”  By taking a good look at the field, this 
research seeks to determine where AFIS has succeeded and where changes could be 
implemented to achieve the desired objectives. Specific investigative questions include:  
1. How rigorous is the current implementation of AFIS in terms of providing analysis of the state 
of the inspected unit? 
2. To what extent does the current implementation of AFIS provide AF senior leaders with AF-
wide reporting IAW Title 10 requirements to report to the Congress on:  readiness problems, 
readiness assessments, combatant command assigned mission assessments (not within the 
purview of AFIS), risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and 
related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates?  
3. Has there been a reduction in time spent preparing for inspection has AFIS achieved from the 
previous model where units spent 350+ days over 5 years on inspection prep.  
4. How much of the responsibility of inspection has been moved back to unit commanders as a 
result of the implementation of AFIS? 
5. In what ways can HHQ utilize system data to provide the field with actionable guidance to 
meet HHQ priorities? 
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Research Focus 
 The research will focus on maintenance and mission support group squadrons from ACC 
and AMC. Data will also be pulled from MICT in order to bolster the validity of qualitative data 
pulled from subject matter experts. SAF/IG is sponsoring this research in order to see what 
potential policy changes are available to better report the effectiveness of the Air Force.  
Theoretical Lens 
 Lincoln and Guba’s responsive constructivist evaluation is used as a theoretical lens to 
conduct this research. This theory proposes that program evaluation needs to take place in an 
atmosphere where the key stakeholders are able to provide their input into the evaluation, versus 
relying solely on the expertise of the evaluator in a vacuum (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). This lens 
provides a basis to conduct the interview portion of this research.  
 
Methodology  
 Chapter III discusses the qualitative and quantitative research methods used in 
researching success in meeting objectives of AFIS. To ascertain the opinions and values of a 
population, a qualitative research method was utilized to gain new insights from subject matter 
experts (SMEs). 19 SMEs were interviewed at the program management, squadron, wing, and 
MAJCOM IG level. The participants were asked questions in a semi-structured interview which 
enabled immediate feedback. This method allowed for the asking of questions that evolved from 
the interview, and provided clarification of answers. Data was collected via a digital recorder and 
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the researcher took notes during the interviews. All recordings were transcribed and the 
researcher coded and analyzed the data. Results were analyzed using descriptive statistics. 
 Quantitative data showing the number of observations that units reported and compared 
to the overall rating of their most recent UEI was pulled from MICT. ANOVA analysis was 
conducted to determine if there was a difference between groups that reported high number of 
observations and groups that reported low numbers of observations. This was done in an attempt 
to see if high levels of self-reporting actually resulted in a more robust UEI inspection.  
Research Goal 
The main implication is that this research better enables SAF/IG to implement AFIS in a 
way that better meets the objectives assigned in AFPAD13-01.  An improved reporting system 
ensures the integrity of the inspection system by not only identifying and documenting 
deficiencies and best practices, but also ensures Airmen expediently and efficiently correct 
broken processes and other identified deficiencies (Johnson, 2013). Further, this research serves 
as a reminder to the field that it is incumbent on us to evaluate the programs that we push down 
to ensure that we are getting everything we were supposed to get.  
In summary, personnel concerned with the efficiency and efficacy of our inspection 
system could use this study and its results. The following chapters will provide a background of 
pertinent literature, the methodology, and the results from the interviews. The concluding chapter 
discusses the potential usage of the results from this research and new avenues of future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Overview 
 Program evaluation is often cited as an important element in determining the value of a 
program’s socio-economic effects, often to the point of declaring whether or not the program is 
“successful” (Laihonen & Linzalone, 2015). Chapter 2 will establish the framework used to 
conduct research on the Air Force Inspection System and also review literature and theoretical 
frameworks used in program evaluation research. It is broken into two sections: discussion of 
theory, and an Air Force document review to identify decision maker objectives.  
The USAF, as a public institution, is often the subject of internal and external program 
reviews and audits. These are often conducted unevenly, based on the expertise of the evaluators 
(Cowin, 1996). The results of evaluations on various defense projects have lasting impact on the 
readiness and effectiveness of the USAF. By evaluating the current practices utilized by SAF/IG, 
we are making an attempt to meet the intent of the IG to “continuously improve the AFIS so 
there is an ever-shrinking difference--both real and perceived--between mission readiness and 
inspection readiness” (SAF/IGI, 2009) 
Section I - Discussion of Theory  
 Ensuring that research is grounded in a solid framework provides researchers a roadmap 
for the way ahead. In the case of program evaluation, several different approaches are available 
each with its own benefits and shortcomings. The critical piece for the researcher is to have a 
solid understanding of what those are when deciding what method to follow (Cowin, 1996). The 
following paragraphs provide an overview of how academic research uses theory within the area 
of program evaluation.   
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Fourth Generation Evaluation and the Responsive Model. 
 The most widely cited model on program evaluation is spelled out in Lincoln and Guba’s 
1989 book Fourth Generation Evaluation. Their book is a critique on what they see as three 
previous periods in the development of program evaluation:  1) Measurement, as exemplified in 
the ideas of Scientific Management from the 1900s to 1930s. 2) Description, which described 
patterns of strengths and weaknesses in regards to stated objectives and really set the stage for 
program evaluation from the 1930s to 1950s. 3) Judgement, where objectives or goals were also 
opened up to be evaluated from the 1960s to 1970s (Cowin, 1996).  
 Throughout all 3 periods there was an emphasis on maintaining a positivist world-view 
when it came to evaluating programs. This emphasis on finding the “truth” often came at the 
expense of ignoring problems of bias within research. This is not to say that other world-views 
“solve” the issue of researcher or subject bias. However, it is acknowledged and steps are taken 
to try to minimize any negative impact that bias will introduce (Kvale, 2007). 
 Lincoln and Guba had a number of critiques of the three previous periods. First, not 
evaluating the values adopted by the evaluators led to issues where consensus could not be 
reached, especially among disparate stakeholders. Lincoln and Guba described this as failing to 
accommodate value-pluralism. Second, the managerial focus of evaluations had a tendency to 
lead evaluations down a certain path, often pre-determined based on what management desired 
the evaluation to conclude. There are many anecdotal accounts of leadership pushing evaluators 
to certain conclusions about pet projects which show that this phenomenon is still very prevalent 
today. Finally, Lincoln and Guba felt that the over commitment to a quantitative approach 
removed context from the life of the program and resulted in weaker explanatory capabilities of 
evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).  
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 Lincoln and Guba recommend a fourth generation of evaluation to flow from this history: 
responsive constructivist evaluation. Responsive evaluation was defined by Lincoln and Guba 
this way: 
 
"Responsive evaluation was so named by its originator, Robert Stake, to signal the idea 
that all stakeholders put at risk by an evaluation have the right to place their claims, 
concerns and issues on the table for consideration (response), irrespective of the value 
system to which they adhere. It was created as the antithesis of preordinate evaluation, 
which assumes the evaluator and the client together possess sufficient information and 
legitimacy to design and implement an evaluation, without the need to consult other 
parties...." 
Constructivism was added to this framework to develop a methodology that accepted that there is 
no objective, scientifically verifiable reality for humans to discover, and constructs would be 
necessary to develop any new knowledge from evidence gathered in the field (Cowin, 1996). To 
constructivists, how people view an object or event and the meaning that they attribute to it is 
what matters (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). 
 The steps of responsive constructivist evaluation can be summarized as: 
1. Identify stakeholders 
2. Introduce claims across all stakeholder groups 
3. Claims that cannot be resolved by stakeholders become the responsibility of the evaluator 
to locate data for. 
4. Negotiate among stakeholders for consensus (Cowin, 1996). 
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Other Evaluation Models 
 The other mix of theories fall into one of three models: goal-based models, decision-
making models, and connoisseurship models. Each has its benefit, but also have their limitations 
that made them less suitable for this study.  
 Goal-based models are designed to measure programs against stated goals. Their major 
limitation lies in the specificity of the goals at the time of formulation. There is a major 
insensitivity to second and third order effects, and there is an assumption made that you can find 
some form of quantitative measure that affords the researcher the capability to make an 
assessment. 
 Decision-making models have the benefit of being utilized while the major decisions of 
the program are being made. They tend to be quantitative and can have sophisticated 
methodologies. They can be single or multiple criterion decision support tools that provide 
decision makers with the data they need to make a quality decision. There are problems with 
decision-making models, however. They assume that the researcher has developed all possible 
alternatives and that decision makers have provided the researcher with all the pertinent values 
and criteria needed to come to the “right” answer. Further, in large organizations, determining 
who has the proper authority to make the decision is not always a straightforward process 
(Cowin, 1996).  
 Connoisseurship models rely on the technical expertise of the evaluator. This has been 
the preferred method of individual inspectors of the previous version of the Air Force Inspection 
System. Emphasis is placed on the person chosen to conduct the evaluation as no two experts 
will have the same value structures or weigh criterion equally. The major limitation of this model 
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is that it becomes difficult to determine whether or not the evaluator’s perception is accurate 
(Cowin, 1996).   
Section II – Air Force Document Research 
Implementation Guidance 
Understanding the regulatory guidance that implemented AFIS is a key requirement in 
conducting any sort of evaluation on that program. The configuration of AFIS is the 
responsibility of SAF/IG, in coordination with SECAF and CSAF and is implemented from 
guidance provided in AFPAD 13-01 using authorities listed in: SECAF and CSAF approved 
Inspection System Guiding Principles, 10 USC § 8020 Inspector General, 10 USC § 8583 
Requirement of Exemplary Conduct, AFMD 1-20, The Inspector General, 23 April 2008, AFPD 
90-2, Inspector General-The Inspection System, 26 April 2006, AFI 90-201, The Air Force 
Inspection System, 23 March 2012, and SAF/IG signed charter of the AFIS Implementation 
Tiger Team, 12 March 2013. 
The Commander’s Inspection Program (CCIP) is the foundation of the AFIS and is set up 
with two key components: 1) An inspection program executed by the wing level IG with support 
from subject-matter experts from the wing. 2) A self-assessment program utilizing the 
Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) that reports compliance with requirements. AFIS 
is structured to inspect and report in accordance with four key areas:  Managing Resources, 
Leading People, Improving the Unit, and Executing the Mission (HQ USAF, 2013). When the 
system was implemented there were two primary lines of effort, establishing inspection 
capability at the wing and headquarters actions to enable and support AFIS.  
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Inspections conducted above the wing level are called Management Inspections and are 
geared at inspecting selected Air Force and MAJCOM level programs. Unit Effectiveness 
Inspections (UEIs) are levied against wings and wing equivalent organizations by the MAJCOM 
IGs and the Air Force Inspection Agency, in the case of DRUs and FOAs. The intent of the UEI 
is not to identify specific cases of non-compliance, but rather to determine the quality of the 
CCIP for the wing commander. They are focused on helping the wing commander identify blind 
spots, poorly focused or misaimed sensors within their CCIP (USAF, 2015).  
 
TIG Briefs 
The Inspector General regularly communicates with the field using TIG briefs, a 
quarterly newsletter detailing developments in the area of inspection. During the formulation of 
the current AFIS, Lt Gen Rogers wrote an article, dated March 2012, detailing the need for a 
change to the system as the previous version did not meet the requirements of the Air Force. He 
stated that the new system needed to strengthen the command function and effectiveness, and 
needed to motivate and promote military discipline and unit performance (Rogers, 2012).  
This message to the field set up his successor, Lt Gen Mueller, to begin the hard work of 
pushing through AFIS and the UEI construct. He set the guiding principles that would be 
embodied in AFIS in his first TIG article, dated May 2012, where he stated that the common 
standards and goals would be: 
• Correcting a lack of self “policing” is critical to AF future 
• Inspection IS a command function 
• The IG is a special duty 
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• Makes us Better 
• Airman’s time is the key issue 
• Functional/Command balance is “out of balance” 
• IG Inspection System is the vector 
• Cost of Compliance is the key variable 
• Squadron is the AF’s organizational building block 
• We need to be pit bulls 
 Several points from this article are now part of the core ethic of AFIS and the UEI 
construct: self-assessment, inspection being a commander’s core responsibility, and compliance 
being a risk assessment to the overall mission.  
Contribution 
 This research aims to apply the responsive model to the status of the Air Force Inspection 
System. The goal is to conduct semi-structured interviews in a way that allows for the 
application of the input from previous interviews as well as allow the conversations to progress 
organically. Based on the results, it should be readily apparent if the responsive model provides a 
good framework to evaluate other Air Force programs.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter laid out the supporting literature and framework for program evaluation and 
the supporting documentation for the implementation of the AFIS. As seen in the reviewed 
research, it is imperative to understand methodology involved in conducting a worthwhile 
program evaluation. At the same time, it is necessary to have a firm understanding of the 
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program to be evaluated in order to maintain credibility. Chapter 3 will delve into the 
methodology to be utilized in this study.  
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III. Methodology 
Overview 
 Chapter 3 describes the qualitative approach taken to evaluate the Air Force Inspection 
System. Section 1 provides a review of qualitative research, the responsive constructivist 
evaluation methodology, and explains why this is the best method to evaluate the Air Force 
Inspection System. Section 2 discusses the steps used to acquire data, the interview subjects and 
guides, and the analysis process.  
Section I – Qualitative Research – Responsive Constructivist Evaluation 
 Responsive constructivist evaluation was the primary tool that was used to conduct this 
research. Responsive constructivist evaluation is orientated on program activities versus program 
goals, and responds to the audience’s needs versus predetermined information categories. 
Responsive constructivist evaluation was focused on by Guba and Lincoln in the 1980s, but was 
more fully developed by Robert Stake, who was an early advocate of qualitative methods for 
evaluating social programs (Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991). Stake advocated for responsive 
evaluation:   
“An evaluation probably will not be useful if the evaluator does not know the interests 
and language of his audiences. During the evaluation study, a substantial amount of time 
may be spent learning about the information needs of the persons for whom the 
evaluation is being done… To be of service and to empathize evaluation issues that are 
important for each program, I recommend the responsive evaluation approach” (Stake, 
1980).  
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This was the best approach for this research because the subject matter is of high interest 
to many of the participants in the study, and it allowed a degree of flexibility needed to construct 
the interview guides and develop the thematic codes necessary in conducting qualitative research 
(Creswell, 2014).  
Applied Framework 
The steps required to complete a responsive evaluation in a culturally sensitive 
framework have been summarized by Askew et al below (Askew, Beverly, & Jay, 2012): 
1. Assemble the evaluation team. Attend to the sociocultural context of the evaluation by 
assembling a team of evaluators who are knowledgeable of and sensitive to the context. 
2. Engage stakeholders. From beginning to end, seek out and involve members from all 
stakeholder groups, attending to distributions of power. 
3. Identify evaluation purpose and intent. Examine the social and political climate of the 
program and the community in which it operates paying particular attention to equitable 
distribution of resources and benefits. 
4. Frame the right questions. Using a democratic process, assess whether the evaluation 
questions reflect the concerns and values of all significant stakeholders including the end 
users. 
5. Design the evaluation. Design comprehensive and appropriate evaluations that take 
advantage of qualitative and quantitative methods to examine and measure important 
cultural and demographic variables. 
6. Select and adapt instruments. Instruments should be identified, developed, adapted and 
validated for the target population, using culturally sensitive language. 
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7. Collect the data. Select data collection methods that are appropriate and respectful of the 
cultural context of the program and the target population. 
8. Analyze the data. Involve representatives from various stakeholder groups, as cultural 
interpreters, to review data and validate evaluators’ inferences and interpretations. 
9. Disseminate and utilize results. Distribute findings broadly using multiple modalities and 
in ways that are consistent with the original purpose of the evaluation and can be 
understood by a wide variety of audiences. 
Section II – Steps Taken 
 The approach taken had three significant steps (Figure 4). The preparatory actions 
included receiving sponsorship from SAF/IG on the research topic, coordinating IRB exemption 
status (see Appendix A for exemption determination letter), preparing the literature, selection of 
interview subjects, and the first iteration of the interview guides. The most important phase of 
the preparatory actions was in interviewee selection.  
 
Figure 4 – Process Flow 
 The Data Collection and Analysis phases included conducting the interviews, coding, and 
the analysis required to get useable results from interview data. The results of this effort are 
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detailed in chapters 4 and 5. The following section details the process followed to identify the 
interview subjects. 
Selection Criteria 
 This research focused on SMEs from Active Duty and Air National Guard units within 
Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). The first step was to 
determine the right mix of SMEs in terms of level of involvement in AFIS. Four levels of input 
for the CCIP were identified:  MAJCOM IG, Wing commander, Squadron Commander, and 
Program Manager (USAF, 2015). The scope was limited to squadrons within maintenance and 
mission support groups. Those organization types are responsible for 35% of deficiencies on 
checklist items (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Deficiencies by Functional Area (MICT) (Maj Jesse Wales, AFIA/ETA, 2016) 
 After narrowing the scope of potential unit types, a list of potential units was generated 
utilizing PASCodesNet (which provides a list of all units in the AF) to generate a list of 2,031 
22 
 
ACC active duty and guard units. With this list, the maintenance and mission support units were 
filtered out, leaving 606 units. A random number generator (RNG) was applied and 9 ACC units 
and 10 AMC units were selected while also applying a proportional quota for the level of 
individual (MAJCOM IG, Squadron Commander, Wing Commander, or Program Manager). A 
RNG was applied to unit type assignments (i.e. Logistics Readiness SQ, Component 
Maintenance SQ, etc.) from the bases identified. If a base did not have a particular function (in 
the case of contracted functions), the RNG was reapplied to correct. This resulted in the 
following selections being made (Table 1): 
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Table 1 – Interview Subjects 
Interview Position Command Base Unit 
1 PM ACC Guard TINKER FSS 
2 WING/CC ACC NELLIS WG 
3 IG AMC SCOTT IG 
4 IG AMC GUARD SCOTT IG 
5 PM AMC DOVER CS 
6 PM ACC MOODY SFS 
7 CC ACC MOODY EMS 
8 CC ACC GUARD TINKER CES 
9 PM AMC TRAVIS MXS 
10 CC AMC GUARD 
Roland R. Wright 
ANGB, Utah AMXS 
11 PM AMC GUARD 
Roland R. Wright 
ANGB, Utah LRS 
12 IG ACC LANGLEY IG 
13 CC AMC DOVER LRS 
14 PM ACC LANGLEY CONS 
15 IG ACC LANGLEY IG 
16 IG AMC SCOTT IG 
17 CC ACC LANGLEY MXS 
18 CC AMC ROBINS FSS 
 
Interview Guide and Process 
After subjects were determined, they were contacted to determine availability and 
whether they would consent. Interviews were semi-structured and conducted over the phone. 
Audio was recorded as the subjects were all geographically separated from the interviewer. The 
interview guide was divided into four different types based on the varying expertise expected 
from respondents. The nature of assignments in the Air Force makes it likely that the individuals 
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assigned to each position do not have equal levels of experience. Therefore it becomes necessary 
to use the initial portion of the interview to gauge what level of experience that the individual has 
in their job. The interview then progressed into topics that sought to answer the investigative 
questions laid out. Those questions used the objectives laid out in AFPD13-01 as a starting point 
(e.g. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?) 
Based on the answers provided by interviewee’s, further inquiry followed along lines that 
capitalized on the interviewee’s specific expertise (Kvale, 2007). After completing an initial set 
of 4 pilot interviews, the interview guide based on the input of from the respondents. See the 
initial set of interview guides in Appendix B.  
Initial Coding 
 Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher speculated what sort of responses 
would be coming from the respondents based on the writing of Air Force officers in publications 
like the TIG Briefs, and commentaries seen in the development of the literature review and prior 
experience. Based on all of this, an initial listing of 38 generic sentiments was developed (Table 
2): 
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Table 2 – Expected Sentiments 
 
 
Additionally a list of research question related sentiments were also developed in order to 
aid in the content analysis of this research effort (Table 3): 
  
Expected Sentiments 
Change in Culture Functionals do help 
No Change in culture System does report Title 10 Requirements well 
Mindset still hasn’t changed System does not report Title 10 Requirements well 
Mindset has changed AFIS increases workload over previous model 
Not Ok with having write ups AFIS decreases workload over previous model 
Ok with having write ups Inspection does not belong to commanders 
Not getting help with write ups Inspection does belong to commanders 
Help is provided with write ups Rigor is lacking in this inspection system 
HHQ is not helpful with guidance Rigor is present in this inspection system 
HHQ is helpful with guidance We need more rigor 
Field fights every single write up We need less rigor 
Field is understanding of write ups CCIP is easily accomplished now 
Field does not understand process CCIP is very difficult to accomplish 
Field does understand process Units are resigned to accomplish 
Culture has changed Units are excited to accomplish 
Culture is in process of changing Self-Assessment is challenging to accomplish 
Guidance is inadequate Self-assessment is easy to accomplish 
Guidance is adequate Training program managers is difficult to accomplish 
Functionals do not help Training program managers is easy to accomplish 
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Table 3 – Research Question Sentiments 
RQ Sentiments 
Meeting PAD objectives 
Self-assessment is not meeting rigor 
requirement 
Not Meeting PAD objectives 
There are many ways to improve guidance 
through system 
AFIS reduces workload 
There are not many ways to improve guidance 
through system 
AFIS does not reduce workload 
There are ways it improve guidance, just not 
through the system 
Inspection is a commanders responsibility  
Inspection is not a  commanders 
responsibility  
Self-assessment is meeting rigor 
requirement  
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor 
requirement 
 
Pilot Interviews 
 Four interviews (one from each group) were selected as the pilot interviews and 
additional inductive codes were developed. Inductive codes are developed after initial pilot 
interviews are conducted, generalizing from those individual interviews expressed sentiments 
onto the whole data set. Those inductive codes are below in Table 4. 
Table 4 – Inductive Codes 
Inductive Codes 
AFIS increases redundancy 
AFIS decreases redundancy 
Risk based decision making is happening 
Risk based decision making is not happening 
AFIS stresses going through the chain 
AFIS does not stress going through the chain 
Expertise on staff is adequate 
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Expertise on staff is lacking 
AFIS does not increase or decrease workload 
Self-assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish 
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do 
SAPM role is challenging 
SAPM role is not challenging 
SAPM role requires more than half of duty day 
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day 
Wartime requirements not captured by communicators 
Wartime requirements are captured by communicators 
AFIS is vulnerable to comm out 
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out 
Manning is adequate 
Manning is not adequate 
 
Coding Methodology 
 In order to accomplish coding, audio data was uploaded to Dedoose, a web-based 
platform for performing qualitative analysis. At this point, excerpts of interviewee responses 
could be created and coded. This allowed for coding to be accomplished in smaller batches and 
increased reliability. Figure 6 is an example of a demo audio file where excerpts were created 
and coded.  
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Figure 6 – Demo Audio Coded 
 This methodology allowed for multiple codes to be applied to the same excerpts, as 
multiple sentiments would be expressed in one question response.  
Validity and Reliability 
Shenton identified 14 techniques to ensure that validity remains high in qualitative 
research studies. Validity is trying to answer the question “How congruent are the findings with 
reality?” Table 5 details the tactics and means of implementation to ensure a high degree of 
validity (Shenton, 2004).  
Table 5 – Validity Tactics  
Tactic Method to implement tactic 
Using well established 
research methods 
Content and Thematic Analysis has been the preferred means 
to conduct responsive evaluation (Cowin, 1996) 
Developing a familiarity of 
the organizations culture 
The researcher is a military professional with over 9 years 
experience in the field and has an appreciation for the culture 
of the Air Force.  
Random sampling Selection of units to interview was done using a random 
number generator to maximize random sampling 
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Triangulation By examining data from MICT, IGEMS, conducting 18 
interviews, and reviewing TIG documents, triangulation can 
be achieved 
Tactics to help ensure honest 
in informants 
In the selection process, the interviewees were given ample 
opportunity to refuse to participate to ensure that only those 
who were willing to participate did so.  
Frequent debriefing sessions Weekly sessions were conducted to ensure that interviewer 
was staying on track and provided perspective as to findings 
 
Qualitative reliability is defined as having a consistent approach across different 
researchers and different projects (Creswell, 2014). Reliability was achieved by using the same 
methodology to code the interviews. Excerpts were created from each response provided by the 
interviewee. The coder then coded the particular excerpt in an effort to prevent being overloaded 
by too much information. This methodology was applied to every interview. 368 total excerpts 
were created from the 18 interviews. Other tactics to ensure reliability are in Table 6, from 
Creswell, include: 
Table 6 – Reliability Tactics 
Tactic Method to implement tactic 
Check transcripts to ensure there are no 
mistakes in transcription 
Coding was accomplished directly from the 
audio files, and quality of the recording was 
tested prior to each interview 
Ensure no drift in definition of codes 146 memos were written during coding 
process to keep codes consistent 
 
 
Analysis 
 The procedures utilized to accomplish the analysis follow Creswell’s process depicted in 
Figure 7 (Creswell, 2014): 
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Figure 7 – Analysis Process Flow (Creswell, 2014) 
 
Throughout this process, quality checks need to occur to ensure that code integrity is 
maintained throughout the research process. Normalized code counts and raw code counts were 
used for reporting due to disparate size groups. The normalization function, an option in a variety 
of Dedoose frequency charts, operates by assigning a weight of '1' to the class with the largest 
number of members (basis class) and then assigns weights to the other classes as a function of 
the numeric relation between the number of members in the class to that of the number of 
members in the 'basis' class. These weights are then used to adjust the number of raw counts to 
accomplish ratio equivalence across class for visualization. The weighted percentage is 
calculated based on these adjusted counts (Dedoose, 2018). 
For example, if we are interested in the relative percentage of codes applied for “manning 
is not adequate” across groups, we calculate as follows in Table 7: 
Interpret 
Data
•What are the 
lessons learned?
Develop 
Narratives
•Determine how 
themes 
interconnect to 
answer RQs
Code Data
•Open coding to 
assign themes
•Axial coding to 
determine 
connections
Understand 
Data
•Organize and 
prepare data
•Get a general 
sense of data
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Table 7 – Normalization Calculation 
Groups # of Class 
Members 
Assigned Weight (basis 
class/class count) 
Raw 
Code 
Count 
Adjusted 
Count (count 
x weight) 
Weighted % 
Program 
Managers 
6 (tied for 
basis) 
1 (6/6) 3 3 (3 x 1) 3.4% 
Squadron 
Commanders 
6 (tied for 
basis) 
1 (6/6) 4 4 (4 x 1) 4.5% 
Wing 
Commanders 
1 6 (6/1) 11 66 (11 x 6) 74.5% 
IG Personnel 5 1.2 (6/5) 13 15.6 (13 x 
1.2) 
17.6% 
    88.6 (sum of 
adjusted 
count) 
 
 
Applying normalization to the wing commander group benefits the research by not allowing the 
contribution of the group to be lost. This can be seen by comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8 – Raw Theme Totals by Group 
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Figure 9 – Normalized Totals by Group 
Report Comparisons 
 Additional statistical analysis was attempted to determine if there is a statistical 
relationship between the results of a units last UEI and the current number of deficiencies noted 
by that units self-assessment program. ANOVA techniques were attempted to see if there were 
different groups within the 5 potential grade groups (Outstanding, Highly Effective, Effective, 
Marginally Effective, and Unsatisfactory).  
 Data queried from the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) to get 
AMCs and ACCs UEI results from 1 October 2013 to 1 October 2017. This resulted in a list of 
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scores and wing designations. Data was requested from AMC and ACC IGI for report of 
deficiencies self-reported through the self-assessment program. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
This research assumes that the personnel interviewed are representative of personnel in 
the field that are an integral part of AFIS.  It is also assumed that the data pulled from MICT is 
accurate.  Stating these assumptions allowed the researcher to generalize the results of the study 
to ACC and AMC at large. 
As to the data analysis, the following limitations applied: data analysis conducted by the 
researcher meant that he or she must interpret the data, but the limitation of interpretation is 
unavoidable (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher's non-presence in the in-person interviews may 
provide a source of bias, and the use of semi structured interviews allows a variety of 
information to come from the interviews which may not be comparable to other participants.   
Other interview limitations included the indirect information filtered through the viewpoints of 
the participants, and that not all people were equally perceptive and articulate (Creswell, 2014).     
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Overview 
Interview and document data revealed that there are many areas where the inspection 
system is meeting the intent of the PAD, however there are several aspects where improvement 
could be made. Making a concerted effort towards changing the culture regarding inspection 
between Active Duty and Guard Units would go a long in meeting the PAD objectives.  
Targeting manning decisions to allow the staff to reap the benefits of the system data provided. 
Additionally, educating commanders on the risk based methodology that AFIS depends on 
would improve the overall quality of the system data available to the staff. The following 
paragraphs discuss the results of the interview data analysis, answer the research and 
investigative questions laid out in Chapter 1, provided additional insights garnered from the 
research.  
Report Comparison 
 ANOVA did not result in a useful product as there is simply not enough variation in the 
outcome variable (Inspection Score). The AMC score report resulted in 21 inspections, all scored 
as “Effective” (Table 8) 
Table 8 – AMC Inspection Results 
Unit Inspection Window Final Score 
**Masked** 07Dec2015 - 11Dec2015 Effective 
**Masked** 09Jul2016 - 18Jul2016 Effective 
**Masked** 20Feb2015 - 27Feb2015 Effective 
**Masked** 02Mar2015 - 22May2017 Effective 
**Masked** 01Feb2015 - 10Apr2017 Effective 
**Masked** 13Jul2015 - 17Jul2015 Effective 
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**Masked** 01Nov2016 - 30Jan2017 Effective 
**Masked** 07Apr2016 - 18Apr2016 Effective 
**Masked** 14Feb2015 - 01May2017 Effective 
**Masked** 14Oct2015 - 24Oct2015 Effective 
**Masked** 02Feb2015 - 10Feb2015 Effective 
**Masked** 25Apr2016 - 31Jul2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
09May2016 - 
23May2016 Effective 
**Masked** 03Dec2016 - 12Dec2016 Effective 
**Masked** 07Apr2016 - 18Apr2016 Effective 
**Masked** 15Sep2014 - 12Dec2016 Effective 
**Masked** 09Jan2015 - 11Jan2015 Effective 
**Masked** 22Jun2015 - 26Jun2015 Effective 
**Masked** 03Mar2015 - 22May2017 Effective 
**Masked** 04Aug2015 - 07Aug2015 Effective 
**Masked** 25Jan2016 - 29Jan2016 Effective 
 
 ACCs score report resulted in 43 inspections with four scores that were not “Effective”, 
one “Outstanding” and three “Marginally Effective” (Table 9).   
Table 9 – ACC Inspection Results 
Unit Inspection Window Rating 
**Masked** 
09Dec2013 - 
13Dec2013 Effective 
**Masked** 
28Feb2016 - 
05Mar2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
11Aug2014 - 
18Aug2014 Effective 
**Masked** 
31Jul2016 - 
06Aug2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
31Mar2014 - 
05Apr2014 Effective 
**Masked** 
10Apr2016 - 
16Apr2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
21Apr2015 - 
25Apr2015 Effective 
**Masked** 14Jun2015 - 19Jun2015 Effective 
**Masked** 11Jun2017 - 17Jun2017 Effective 
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**Masked** 
24Apr2016 - 
30Apr2016 Outstanding 
**Masked** 
03Nov2016 - 
10Nov2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
22Feb2015 - 
28Feb2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
10Sep2017 - 
16Sep2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
24Feb2017 - 
26Feb2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
03Mar2017 - 
05Mar2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
28Feb2017 - 
02Mar2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
15Sep2014 - 
23Sep2014 Effective 
**Masked** 
23Oct2016 - 
29Oct2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
08Nov2015 - 
13Nov2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
09Feb2017 - 
15Feb2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
28Feb2016 - 
05Mar2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
23Aug2015 - 
29Aug2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
24Sep2017 - 
30Sep2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
22Mar2015 - 
28Mar2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
12Mar2017 - 
18Mar2017 Effective 
**Masked** 31Jan2016 - 06Feb2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
13Mar2016 - 
19Mar2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
16Nov2015 - 
20Nov2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
17Sep2017 - 
23Sep2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
13Sep2015 - 
19Sep2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
17Sep2017 - 
23Sep2017 
Marginally 
Effective 
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**Masked** 
01Nov2015 - 
07Nov2015 Effective 
**Masked** 
28Feb2016 - 
05Mar2016 Effective 
**Masked** 01Jun2015 - 17Jun2015 Effective 
**Masked** 05Jun2017 - 16Jun2017 Effective 
**Masked** 
14Nov2016 - 
18Nov2016 
Marginally 
Effective 
**Masked** 
31Mar2014 - 
05Apr2014 Effective 
**Masked** 
10Apr2016 - 
16Apr2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
01Nov2015 - 
07Nov2015 Effective 
**Masked** 10Jan2016 - 16Jan2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
14Nov2016 - 
18Nov2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
14Nov2016 - 
18Nov2016 Effective 
**Masked** 
14Nov2016 - 
18Nov2016 
Marginally 
Effective 
 
 As a result of only having 6% of inspections earning scores outside of “Effective”, it 
would not be feasible to interpret an ANOVA result on these groups. This does highlight a 
weakness in the Air Force’s compliance reporting: with 94% of units receiving a middle score, 
defending this scoring system to outside agencies would be difficult, especially if that outside 
agency attempts a similar  
Themes Analysis 
 Interviews were coded according to the codes listing. This provided a way to tally the 
amount of times a code was used or referenced and provided a means to determine which theme 
was most important. Codes were then arranged into themes and initial statistics were looked at to 
determine relative importance of each theme. Table 10 shows the theme list totals.  
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Table 10 – Thematic Statistics and Total Coding Totals 
 
 Figure 10 provides a comparison of the total code count by theme by groups. Based on 
the strict totals, the majority (30%) of the codes come from the Self-Assessment codes and the 
smallest contribution (20%) come from the PAD Objectives codes.  
Theme Theme Total Theme % Code Total Code Total
 Change in Culture 22  Culture has changed 18
 No Change in Culture 8  Culture is in process of changing 31
 Mindset still hasn't changed 19  AFIS increases redundancy 17
 Mindset has changed 35  AFIS reduces redundancy 12
 Not Ok with having writeups 8  Risk based decisionmaking is happening 20
 Ok with having writeups 6  Risk based decision making is not happening 10
Culture Totals 206
 Not Getting help with writeups 3  Functionals do not help 12
 Help is provided with writeups 16  Functionals do help 13
 HHQ is not helpful with guidance 19  AFIS stresses going through chain 25
 HHQ is helpful with guidance 29  AFIS does not stress going through chain 1
 Field fights every single write up 4  There are many ways to improve guidance through system 5
 Field is understanding of write ups 11  There are not many ways to improve guidance through system 5
 Field does not understand process 11  There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system 11
 Field does understand process 19  Expertise on staff is adequate 3
 Guidance is inadequate 10  Expertise on the staff is lacking 5
 Guidance is adequate 7
HHQ Totals 209
 System does report Title 10 Requirements well 4  Not meeting PAD objectives 29
 System does not report Title 10 Requirements well 14  AFIS reduces workload 4
 AFIS increases workload over previous model 23  AFIS does not reduce workload 24
 AFIS decreases workload over previous model 8  AFIS does not increase or decease workload 2
 Inspection does not belong to commanders 2  Inspection is a commanders responsibility 18
 Inspection does belong to commanders 17  Inspection is not a commanders responsibility 3
 Meeting PAD objectives 24
PAD Objectives Totals 172
 Rigor is lacking in this inspection system 21  Training program managers is easy to accomplish 3
 Rigor is present in this inspection system 15  Self assessment is meeting rigor requirement 19
 We need more rigor 16  Self assessment is not meeting rigor requirement 5
 We need less rigor 2  Self assessment is exceeding rigor requirement 1
 CCIP is easily accomplished now 8  SAPM role is challenging 15
 CCIP is very difficult to accomplish 15  SAPM role is not challenging 2
 Units are resigned to accomplish 6  SAPM role requires more than half of duty day 3
 Units are excited to accomplish 6  SAPM role requires less than half of duty day 5
 Self Assessment is challenging to accomplish 22  War time requirement not captured by communicators 7
 Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish 16  War time requirement is captured by communicators 5
 Self assessment is easy to accomplish 5  AFIS is vulnerable to comm out 2
 Training program managers is difficult to accomplish 7  AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out 0
 Training program managers is not hard or easy to do 5  Manning is adequate 10
 Manning is not adequate 31
Theme Totals 839 Self-Assessment Totals 252
172 20.50%
252 30.04%
Culture
HHQ Relationship
Self Assessment
PAD Objectives
206 24.55%
209 24.91%
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Figure 10 – Code Totals by Theme 
 Within the Self-Assessment theme, there were three sub themes that emerged as strong 
findings: Rigor, Organizational Implementation, and Individual Implementation. Of the 252 Self-
Assessment Theme code applications, 91 (36%) came from the Rigor sub theme, 119 (47%) 
came from the Organizational Implementation sub theme, and 42 (16%) came from the 
Individual Implementation sub theme. Figure 11 provides normalized counts of the code 
occurrences within each of the sub themes.  
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Figure 11 – Normalized Sub Theme Counts 
Results 
Once all of the interviews were coded, tables organized around whether or not the theme 
was treated positively or negatively by the interviewee were generated. The purpose was to see 
the overall impression that groups have towards the efficacy of AFIS. For example, comparing 
tables of Self-Assessment codes produces Figure 12: 
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Figure 12 – Self-Assessment Sentiments 
Figure 12 indicates that the Air Force does not man the inspection system in an adequate 
fashion, being identified 31 times. It also says that the Air Force, over all groups, is meeting the 
rigor requirements. There were 3 neutral categories of response within this particular theme. 
They were used once it was determined that it was a repeated sentiment response.  
Code co-occurrence was also examined. This looks at the excerpts where multiple codes 
are attached and counts the co-occurrence of 2 codes. Table 11 is a portion of the entire code co-
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occurrence chart. This metric pinpointed which codes were good candidates for combining or 
were more important to the overall theme. It also assisted in ensuring reliability as shifts in code 
meaning can be identified when unlike codes become more prevalent together. This acts as a 
trigger for the researcher to go back and ensure that coding those excerpts that way was 
appropriate.  
Table 11 – Portion of Code Co-Occurrence Table 
 
Table 11 shows that there were 7 instances where SAPM role is challenging intersected 
with AFIS does not reduce workload. Those 2 codes were identified during the initial coding 
session as most likely being identified together.  
Investigative Question #1 
How rigorous is the current implementation of AFIS in terms of providing analysis of the state of 
the inspected unit? 
 This was a critical investigative question. As a result, a larger series of codes was 
developed along with three sub themes to help in answering the question from the position of 
experts that use this system. The overall result of asking whether or not self-assessment as 
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currently implemented throughout the units is that we are meeting a perceived self-assessment 
requirement. There is some indication that we could benefit from integrating more rigor into the 
self-assessment process, but there is also an indication that units are not eager to take on the 
additional workload to accomplish this.  
 Examining the rigor component of this question requires a look at the rigor components 
of the self-assessment codes. Figure 13 gives the rigor themed normalized code counts across 
groups. The program managers and IG personnel give high levels of agreement that we are 
meeting the rigor requirement as stated in the AFI.  
 
Figure 13 – Normalized Rigor Code Counts 
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 Figure 14 gives an indication as to why units are not eager to attempt to improve the 
system at their level. The primary reason is Wing Commanders and IG personnel believe that the 
manning associated in AFIS (SAPMs, Wing IG offices, MAJCOM IG offices, etc.) is 
insufficient to complete the job now.  
 
Figure 14 – Normalized Organization Implementation Code Counts 
Figure 15 is a representation of the view from the individuals that do the leg work of the 
inspection system. There is a wide disparity of how much daily input goes into a self-assessment 
program, but there is wide agreement between Program Managers, Squadron Commanders, and 
Wing commanders that the SAPM role is challenging.  
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Figure 15 – Normalized Individual Implementation Counts 
 
Program Managers 
 Program managers believe that the self-assessment is meeting the rigor requirement 
needed to provide adequate information about the status of their unit’s compliance. There were 
no negative codes associated with program managers on this particular topic. When asked 
whether or not there was rigor in the responses, there were slightly more negative responses 
expressed. Figure 16 gives the Self-Assessment theme codes arranged by 
agreement/disagreement.  
 As to the difficulties associated with running a self-assessment program, the codes 
captured a sense that it was moderately difficult to accomplish. This can be seen in Figure 16, in 
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the codes CCIP is easily accomplished now, Units are excited to accomplish, Self-Assessment is 
not easy or challenging to accomplish, and Self-Assessment is easy to accomplish.  
 
Figure 16 – Program Manager Self-Assessment Codes 
 There were some differences in opinion depending on how much experience program 
managers had in program evaluation. A newer SAPM had this to say about the difficulty in 
running a newer program:  
"I would say my biggest challenge is the system. I feel like I can navigate it well 
enough, but telling where my people are at, and figuring out what questions they've 
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answered and what checklists they've completed, and all the associated 
management related is my biggest challenge right now." 
This SAPM felt that determining where their program managers are in terms of meeting 
their reporting obligations can be a real challenge. They have the support of their local IG team 
to help them navigate MICT, but there is still a pretty steep learning curve for someone who has 
not spent a lot of time in program management/evaluation. 
A more experienced SAPM looked at the inspections from the MAJCOM and Wing 
differently: 
"I don’t call them inspections, we get an opportunity to educate the unit, help identify 
their blind spots, do some risk based sampling in areas and programs that their commander 
should be aware of, educate them on things that, hey this is where you could do better, and also 
point out any weaknesses or problems in their programs so they can improve." 
This more experienced program manager views the MAJCOMs role to assess the wings 
inspection program, not to inspect it. The key difference is that assessment provides the unit an 
opportunity to improve, where inspection happens in a moment in time. 
 
 Squadron Commanders 
 Squadron commanders view the current state of the self-assessment component of AFIS 
as meeting the stated objectives, however they all believe that there is ample room for rigor to be 
increased in the system. A squadron commander expressed that by only going in 2 times a year, 
they were much more motivated to ensure that the entries that were put into the self-assessments 
were of high quality. Doing them monthly invites a level of complacency that is difficult to ferret 
out, especially in the absence of a strong outside look:  
48 
 
 
"Overall we had better rigor when we only had to do this in September and 
March, and the reason for that is because it’s so run of the mill now, that we don't 
feel we have to try that hard." 
 
Figure 17 – Squadron Commander Self-Assessment Codes 
An examination of Figure 17 shows that there was no agreement with the sentiment that 
we apply too much rigor to the system. There was also a neutral response that the AF is 
exceeding the rigor requirement.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rigor is present in this inspection system
We need less rigor
CCIP is easily accomplished now
Units are excited to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
SAPM role is not challenging
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
War time requirement is captured by communicators
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
Manning is adequate
Squadron Commander Self-Assessment Codes
Squadron Commander Disagree Squadron Commander Agree
49 
 
Wing Commanders 
 Wing commanders are extremely skeptical regarding the amount of rigor being applied in 
self-assessment (Figure 18). They view these commander programs as needing to have some sort 
of strong guidance from HHQ to ensure that the right sorts of activities are regarded as being 
“above the line” activities. When asked to rate how he viewed self-assessment being conducted 
in the squadrons, this wing commander had this to say: 
“Very hit or miss. Its very Commander dependent, like everything is. But the 
commander only has so much time and energy to focus on things. So, to the 
extent that a commander focuses on it you're going to get good stuff out of it. But 
to the extent that a commander is doing other things that might be just as 
important or more so at the time and you're depending on that frontline guy to fill 
out the checklist right, that's when you see a lot of unidentified non-compliance 
start creeping in” 
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Figure 18 – Wing Commander Self-Assessment Codes 
Inspector General Personnel 
 IG personnel are much more evenly split as to whether or not there is sufficient rigor in 
the inspection system (Figure 19). They do agree that the amount of rigor that is present in the 
system is sufficient to meet the requirement as it is currently laid out, however. There is also a 
huge concern that the amount of manning that is present within the inspection enterprise is 
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insufficient to meet the need of eliminating the blind spots that are present in every unit. One IGI 
member had this to say on the topic:   
“Due to manning cuts at the various 2 letter levels, Continual Eval is not 
occurring in a robust enough fashion and we’re concerned that the issues that are 
being identified by the field that could have policy solutions are not being 
addressed by the staff.” 
 
Figure 19 – IG Personnel Self-Assessment Codes 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Rigor is present in this inspection system
We need less rigor
CCIP is easily accomplished now
Units are excited to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
SAPM role is not challenging
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
War time requirement is captured by communicators
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
Manning is adequate
IG Personnel Self-Assessment Codes
IG Disagree IG Agree
52 
 
Overall 
The Air Force is meeting a perceived self-assessment rigor requirement. There is some 
indication that there could benefit from integrating more rigor into the self-assessment process, 
but there is also an indication that units are not eager to take on the additional workload to 
accomplish this. 
Investigative Question #2 
To what extent does the current implementation of AFIS provide AF senior leaders with 
AF-wide reporting IAW Title 10 requirements to report to the Congress on:  readiness problems, 
readiness assessments, combatant command assigned mission assessments (not within the 
purview of AFIS), risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and 
related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates?  
 There is disagreement between IG personnel and Wing Commanders on whether or not 
Title 10 requirements are being met. Figure 20 shows the overall count of expressed 
agreement/disagreement from the stakeholder groups on the code “Does the AF meet its Title 10 
requirements for reporting?” 
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Figure 20 – System does report Title 10 requirements 
Program Managers 
AFI 90-201 require commanders to appoint Program Managers to record self-assessments 
and appoint other assessors to conduct assessments based on the communicators assigned. They 
act as a primary quality control for the assessments conducted throughout the unit before they 
reach the commander for approval. Thus, these individuals are in a unique position within the 
unit’s inspection regime and possess key insights at the unit level.  
Looking at the rates of positive and negative response from program managers to 
questions geared at this IQ gives the overall impression that there is a slightly positive 
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impression that the Air Force is meeting its Title 10 responsibilities. Figure 21 below explains in 
greater detail the particular code counts.  
 
Figure 21 – Program Manager PAD Objective Sentiments 
Program managers largely acknowledge that AFIS now provides the commander of the 
unit much more of an up to date understanding of the status of the compliance programs s/he is 
responsible for. This fits very much in line with meeting PAD objectives and allows for accurate 
reporting to the Congress IAW Title 10. One program manager described the benefits of the 
current system over the previous system this way:  
"I think this system makes the commander maintain a higher knowledge level of 
his squadron throughout the year, versus the old system where they didn’t really 
find out until right before the inspection" 
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Squadron Commanders 
 Squadron commanders were in a better position to answer specifically whether or not 
Title 10 requirements were being accomplished. The overall sentiment regarding Title 10 
requirements was negative, by more than 2 to 1. Looking at the overall PAD objectives, 
however, show that squadron commanders are more positive in thinking that AFIS is meeting its 
PAD objectives. There is a strong sentiment that the current inspection model increases workload 
over the previous model, as seen inFigure 22.  
 
Figure 22 – Squadron Commander PAD Objective Sentiments 
The main problem squadron commanders have with believing that AFIS is an 
improvement on reporting title 10 requirements was summed up by a commander below: 
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"If we're trying to report on readiness, that’s why we have the ART, 
SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, all that kinda of stuff. And that’s not inspectable 
as far as compliance goes. So I don't know if... I think they're cousins, but 
I don't think they're brothers." 
They view all of the actions conducted by the wing IG and MAJCOM IG and don’t see 
where these compliance-focused inspections equate to providing readiness data that is required. 
The preponderance of operational communicators are geared at answering whether or not units 
stay within the limits of what’s provided by AFI, and do not address the detailed activities that 
are requested through ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, etc. The by-law communicators are even 
more focused on the compliance activities that the individuals that are appointed to positions of 
responsibility have taken. As a result, AFIS has not made a difference in reporting readiness and, 
as it is required to report to the Wing on a monthly basis, takes more of a commander’s time than 
the previous model did.  
Wing Commanders 
 Wing Commanders tend to be ambivalent as to whether or not we are meeting Title 10 
requirements or PAD objectives (Figure 23). They are much more of the opinion that AFIS 
increases the workload on their staffs to accomplish inspection, however.  
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Figure 23 – Wing Commander PAD Objective Sentiments 
A wing commander had this to say when asked as to whether or not Title 10 objectives 
were being met: 
“I would say no from those kinds of areas. We're more in line when it comes to by 
law programs and inspections that need to be done. In those areas that actually 
does a good job. My IGI breaks out all the inspections that we're going to do 
throughout the year and it clearly delineates which ones are by law inspections 
that we got to get done. With that we prioritize appropriately and get those 
inspections done. To the extent that there are other title 10 things, like you 
mentioned reporting on readiness and some of those other things, it has not been 
my experience at those things lend themselves, particularly readiness, to the IG 
process.”  
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Inspector General Personnel 
 IG personnel were strongly of the opinion that AFIS does not meet Title 10 requirements 
for readiness reporting (Figure 24). Further they were even more strongly of the opinion that 
AFIS is not meeting its PAD objectives as defined. Many of the individuals interviewed from the 
different IG staffs were very excited to describe the newer readiness exercises that are being 
rolled out over the next few years.  
 
Figure 24 – IG Personnel PAD Objective Sentiments 
These individuals recognized that there is a significant gap in the system that they hope to 
fill by reintroducing readiness inspections. The understanding is that the current version of AFI 
90-201 does have readiness inspection requirements, however they are at the discretion of the 
wing commander. Therefore, many commanders are taking the risk of only accomplishing 
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smaller taskings to reduce the overall cost in time and money that a full-up inspection would 
incur.  
Overall 
 There is an agreement between IG personnel, squadron commanders, and wing 
commanders that Title 10 readiness reporting requirements are not being met with the current 
implementation of AFIS. This sentiment is best summed up by an IG member 
“I think there has been some concern on whether or not this system is able to give 
a good read to senior leaders on whether or not the wings are able to do what they 
need to do. Now having said that I think the senior leadership is a little bit 
culpable in not answering the question, ready for what?” 
Investigative Question #3 
Has there been a reduction in time spent preparing for inspection that AFIS achieved 
from the previous model where units spent 350+ days over 5 years on inspection prep. 
This particular question can be answered by focusing on the culture-themed codes. By 
looking to see if there is an acknowledgement of a cultural shift, then we would see a reduction 
in time spent on “inspection prep”. As culture takes years to move in any direction, we are more 
likely to see the climate change first, which is what we see when examining the agreement and 
disagreement codes between all stake holder groups. Figure 25 shows that the IG and Wing 
Commander groups view the culture as largely the same as before the implementation of AFIS, 
where Squadron Commanders and Program Managers see that there has been a change in culture 
and the way they approach inspection.  
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Figure 25 – Normalized Percentage of Culture Codes by Group 
 
Program Managers 
 Program Managers tend to respond positively that the culture has changed in the Air 
Force when it comes to inspection prep and the nature inspection in general by about a 2 to 1 
ratio, as can be seen in Figure 26. They also agree that there is a reduction in redundancy in 
inspection, now that gatekeepers are in place to try to de-conflict inspections from within the AF 
and also from outside agencies. One program manager gave this insight:   
“My impression is that outside agencies are using the gatekeeper process which 
helps limit and de-conflict the number of inspections that we are faced with. 
Where possible, the agencies are furnished with preexisting data from self- 
assessment that also helps in limiting the redundancy of inspections from outside 
agencies.” 
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Figure 26 – Program Manager Culture Sentiments 
Squadron Commanders 
 Squadron Commanders are very much of the opinion that the overall culture and mindset 
around inspection has changed in accordance with the PAD objectives (Figure 27). They 
acknowledge that day to day actions are simply documenting the mission and do not consider the 
effort made in that documentation to be “inspection prep”. One squadron commander summed 
up the effort this way:  
“Its leadership walking around and making sure that were in accordance with and 
doing things the right way. It’s a little bit old school. We're holding folks 
accountable for using their tech data, and doing the right steps and using the right 
tools, and that’s where it starts. Its start with that discipline and accountability. No 
inspection system is going to work if you don’t have that". 
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Figure 27 – Squadron Commander Culture Sentiments 
Wing Commanders 
Wing Commanders view this issue of inspection prep differently than the squadron 
commanders. As they are required to staff the inspector general position “out of hide”, they are 
finding that finding qualified personnel to step into the role of inspector is eating up the time 
savings that they were supposed to receive from not “preparing”. Further the monthly CIMB 
requirement is non-trivial for the wing as a whole. A wing commander delved into the topic of 
second order effects from pulling manpower from organizations to fill what they view as a tax: 
“… but the second and third order effects of taking this high man hour intensive 
inspection on at the wing level, and doing it out of hide is that other things where 
you pulled these bodies from, their workload goes up. So, my IGI is populated by 
two people from The Defenders, 2 TSgts that made master sergeant from the 
defenders, so that's work that ain't being done down in security forces. My chief 
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of IGI comes from one of the medical squadrons, a major completely out of hide 
and that's work that ain't being done down there. That's the other workload that's 
affected that isn't captured well.” 
There was consensus that, at the unit level, the culture of preparing for inspection has 
diminished, however there are concerns at each unit as well about what this does:   
“I think that part of it worked pretty much as required or as advertised.  But just 
because less prep means you're going to end up with more time to be ready.  I 
think there’s still in my mind an open question of Commander's inspecting 
themselves and finding blind spots.  Part of prepping for the IG to come was that 
you didn't know what you didn't know, and the unknown unknowns as the former 
Secretary of Defense said, so you try to find all the unknown unknowns as best 
you can. Now when you're inspecting yourself, and you are the only review of 
what you did, I don't have a lot of confidence at my blind spots are being 
covered.” 
Figure 28 shows raw counts for culture sentiments expressed by Wing Commanders. 
There is a good indication here that the Wing Commander view is that there has not been much 
culture change as of yet.  
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Figure 28 – Wing Commander Culture Sentiments 
Inspector General Personnel 
 Inspector General Personnel are not under the impression that AFIS is complete in its 
culture change mission to reduce inspection prep. Figure 29 indicates that IGIs view a non-trivial 
amount of difference between reserve units and active duty units, where reserve units are still 
trying to stick to their previous model of preparing for inspection immediately prior to the 
inspection. MAJCOM IGI personnel had this to say when asked if they were seeing reductions in 
inspection prep type actions:  
“I'd say we still have a way to go, especially in our Air National Guard units.  
There are some pretty strong indications that a lot of them still put a ton of effort 
into getting ready for the inspections.  We are making incremental progress, what 
challenges us most in turning concept into reality is the lack of capacity to 
actually do continual evaluation over the 5-year cycle for guard units and 2-year 
cycle for active wings in terms of the steady-state you're always getting feedback 
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from your functional stove pipe and a bunch of feedback at the capstone, so we 
still have that problem of most of the Wings feedback is coming in two doses, 
midpoint and a capstone.  And what they're getting from the over the horizon 
continual evaluation it's still pretty thin so that's the biggest thing that probably 
still allows Wings to still live in the model of we can let things degrade to a 
degree and then just bump up the level of performance to please inspectors when 
they get there.” 
 
Figure 29 – IG Personnel Culture Sentiments 
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The IG and Wing Commander groups view the culture as largely the same as before the 
implementation of AFIS. Squadron Commanders and Program Managers state that there has 
been a change in culture and the way they approach inspection. Wing commanders and IG 
personnel view units that will ramp up prior to inspections, which they believe go against the 
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is minimal and should be done to prevent losing face to outside organizations, and is simply 
human nature, however there has been a massive reduction in time spent on preparing for 
inspection as compared to the previous system.  
 
Investigative Question #4 
How much of the responsibility of inspection has been moved back to unit commanders 
as a result of the implementation of AFIS? 
This question can be answered by recording two standalone codes. The first asked if 
inspection belonged to commanders, meaning do the activities required to conduct inspection 
reside at the commander’s level. The second code asked if the responsibility belonged to 
commanders to conduct inspection. This was aimed at determining if the authorities existed at 
the commander level to execute these inspections.  
Based on these codes, Figure 30 is a normalized count look at how often interviewees 
agreed/disagreed that the responsibility for inspection belonged to commanders code and with 
the inspection is a commanders responsibility code. There is consensus among all groups that the 
responsibility and the de facto reality is that commanders are able and have the responsibility to 
conduct meaningful inspections on their units.  
One IG member stated that “between 90-201, 1-1, and direction from CSAF on down, it’s 
clear that inspection is a commander’s responsibility. The key difference of why this AFIS is 
better than the previous IS comes from the breakdown in the taboo about admitting deficiencies. 
Hiding your deficiencies from the inspector did not help anyone, but now there’s no point in 
hiding because they should have been documented a long time ago. The old model didn’t allow 
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that. It brought more fear than actual compliance. The here to help wasn't really a true statement 
under the old way, now it is a true statement." 
 
 
Figure 30 – Normalized Occurrence of Inspection Codes 
 
Risk-based decision making was also examined. AFIS is mandated to promote risk-based 
decision making at the command level as a means of deciding which inspectable activities will 
fall “below the line”. These are activities that will not be completed in accordance with 
regulations after consideration by leadership, and the application of some form of risk analysis. 
Codes were developed to see whether or not risk based decision making was occurring in the 
field.  
 -  2.00  4.00  6.00  8.00  10.00  12.00  14.00
Program Manager
Squadron Commander
Wing Commander
IG Personnel
Normalized Inspection Codes
Inspection is not a commanders responsibility
Inspection is a commander responsibility
Inspection does not belong to commanders
Inspection does belong to commanders
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Figure 31 – Normalized Occurrence of Risk Based Decision Making is Happening 
 Figure 31 shows that risk-based decision making is much more on the minds of IG and 
squadron commanders than it is on program managers, however it is not mentioned by wing 
commanders at all. There is another concern here, however. When all of the squadron level 
personnel (squadron commanders and program managers) were queried as to the number of 
waivers they had submitted, all 12 responded that there were no waivers in the system. This 
option to not submit waivers and just deal with write-ups circumvents the risk based system that 
AFIS tries to promote. This is summed up by one squadron commander: 
“Because the system does not increase workload over the previous model, I 
haven't felt the need to go in and try to improve the system by working with the 
functional.” 
Program Managers 
 When program managers are broken out and asked if inspection responsibility lies with 
the commander, they overwhelmingly respond affirmatively. But when asked if a risk-based 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
IG
Program Manager
Squadron Commander
Wing Commander
Normalized Count of Code Risk Based Decision 
Making is Happening
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approach is taken to decision making, Figure 32 shows there is almost a 2 to 1 negative response. 
This possibly represents the portion of culture change that senior leaders need to target an AF 
wide education campaign as to what “embracing the red” really means.  
 
Figure 32 – Program Manager Responsibility Codes 
  
Squadron Commanders 
 Squadron commanders are much more positive in their assessment that risk based 
decision making is occurring than the program managers (Figure 33). However, when they were 
asked directly as to the reason why they hadn’t submitted waivers to the IG for programs, they 
all responded that they were under the impression that the process was fairly simple, however 
they just hadn’t felt the need to go through the process. It seemed easier for them to have certain 
write-ups that they could address in their own time.  
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Program Manager Agree Program Manager Disagree
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Figure 33 – Squadron Commander Responsibility Codes 
 When asked the question about whether or not AFIS moved the responsibility to them as 
opposed to the previous model of inspection, many commanders felt that the responsibility was 
always on them to accomplish inspection. One commander that had experience being inspected 
under both regimes summed it up this way: 
"I'm unfamiliar with what they were trying to fix with the new inspection system, 
I hate to say. I'm not sure what they were trying to fix, cause I never saw a 
problem with the old system." 
Wing Commanders 
Wing commanders feel that fairly strongly that inspection belongs to commanders at all 
levels at a 2 to 1 level as shown in Figure 34. When asked if we could have received the benefits 
of the current AFIS from the old system, one wing commander responded:   
“I would say it does accomplish that goal, and the old system probably would not 
have gotten those benefits. The commander's definitely feel more of a burden and 
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empowerment perhaps to inspect themselves.  I think we won't know if it was 
worth it until we get a sense of those blind spots and the other work that ain't 
being done because he shifted that workload from the MAJCOM down to the 
commanders.”  
 
 
Figure 34 – Wing Commander Responsibility Codes 
 
Inspector General Personnel 
IG personnel had high levels of agreement with the code Risk-based decision making is 
happening (Figure 35). They applied a risk based model in their preparations to conduct UEIs. 
They view Continual Evaluation conducted by the 2-letter staff as an integral piece to risk-based 
analysis and in moving the responsibility of inspection to the commander by providing 
information to them during the inspectable periods and outside of it as well.  
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Figure 35 – Inspector General Responsibility Codes 
  
 When asked about whether or not the responsibility for inspection had been moved to the 
commander, this IGI member stated: 
“We've made inspection a commander responsibility. Where we still need to help 
commanders is in getting them resources to accomplish that, whether that’s 
through funded IG positions or SAPMs” 
Overall 
 There is consensus among all groups that the responsibility and the de facto reality is that 
commanders are able and have the responsibility to conduct meaningful inspections on their 
units. This is a result of regulatory changes within AFI 1-1 and AFI 90-201, as well as cultural 
changes such as having CIMB meetings at the wing monthly putting the responsibility for 
inspection on squadron commanders.  
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Investigative Question #5 
In what ways can HHQ utilize system data to provide the field with actionable guidance to meet 
HHQ priorities? 
 Continual Evaluation and constant feedback to the unit is a hallmark to AFIS. Based on 
the overall response received from interviewee’s, we can see that the field is happy 
communicating up the chain as needed. The two trouble areas highlighted in Figure 36 show 
issues with the perceived level of expertise on the staff and the quality of the guidance that is 
received from staffs.  
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Figure 36 – Normalized HHQ Relationship Codes Across All Groups 
Program Managers 
Program managers tend to believe that communicating with their wing IGs and other 
HHQ agencies is the real way to ensure that progress can be made in ensuring that the guidance 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 Not Getting help with writeups
 Help is provided with writeups
 HHQ is not helpful with guidance
 HHQ is helpful with guidance
 Field fights every single write up
 Field is understanding of write ups
 Field does not understand process
 Field does understand process
 Guidance is inadequate
 Guidance is adequate
 Functionals do not help
 Functionals do help
 AFIS stresses going through chain
 AFIS does not stress going through chain
 There are many ways to improve guidance through
system
 There are not many ways to improve guidance through
system
 There are ways to improve guidance, just not through
system
 Expertise on staff is adequate
 Expertise on the staff is lacking
Normalized HHQ Relationship Code Counts
Wing Commander Squadron Commander Program Manager IG
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being provided is actionable by the field. They do see that the cuts to the MAJCOM staffs has 
depleted the expertise that was there before, but also see that functionals are still trying to 
provide relevant help where they can (Figure 37).  
 
Figure 37 - Program Manager HHQ Relationship Codes 
One program manager described the possibility of using system data to improve guidance 
this way: 
“I think the checklists do provide a good sight picture that could tell HAF or 
someone else what the operational situation is in the field, but again, it depends on 
what’s being put into the system. If they come out and do a SAV and come to find 
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Help is provided with writeups
HHQ is helpful with guidance
Field is understanding of write ups
Field does understand process
Guidance is adequate
Functionals do help
AFIS stresses going through chain
There are many ways to improve guidance through system
There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system
Expertise on staff is adequate
Program Manager HHQ Relationship Codes
Program Manager Disagree Program Manager Agree
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out that we haven’t been doing our stuff right and it drives a undetected non-
compliance, then they’re more likely to discount what’s provided in the systems” 
Squadron Commanders 
 Figure 38 shows that squadron commanders are evenly split as to whether or not the 
guidance coming from headquarters is helpful. They are also slightly negative in their perception 
that it is possible to improve the system through the feedback provided in self-assessments.  
 
Figure 38 - Squadron Commander HHQ Relationship Codes 
One commander strongly feels that MAJCOMs could improve guidance based on input 
from the field, but doesn't believe they are taking that input into account when developing 
policy: 
"I think they could, but my question is are they?" 
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This sentiment is echoed by another commander describing their experience when they 
went through an inspection where the MAJCOM IG came down, but did not have much of an 
interaction with them: 
"We just had an inspection, and it was so insignificant I'm not really sure whether 
or not it was the IG...They do have some knowledgeable people, but they're just 
not out and about enough for me to tell you whether or not it’s worth it. 
Wing Commanders 
 The wing commanders interviewed were of the opinion that the manning situation at the 
staff has a lot to do with the quality of response provided by staff to actionable information 
generated in the system. If the staffs are overwhelmed by tasks and undermanned, then the first 
activity not to be done is continual evaluation. Therefore, it becomes absolutely imperative for 
the field to be talking directly to the staff to get guidance concerns addressed, outside of the 
system. This can be seen in their responses (Figure 39).  
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Figure 39 - Wing Commander HHQ Relationship Codes 
When asked what they believe drives the inadequate guidance provided by the staff, a 
wing commander responded: 
“I think it's more the stove piping we've done of authority into the functionals. 
There's so much that is out of the Commander's hands, but to be honest with you 
ACC doesn't have much of a say in it. So much of this stuff is written into AFI by 
functionals out of the Commander's hands, leave in the commander with a whole 
lot of accountability but not a lot of responsibility. So, stuff goes wrong he's 
getting fired, but she doesn't have a lot of capability to affect those things. And I 
don't think the system is getting that. But conceivably it could, because there is a 
process to get a waiver follow it through that would do it, but it's not track very 
well. It took four-star involvement to figure out where all the waivers are and 
who's tracking them. Because enough of the ACC Wing Commanders put in the 
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COMACC quarterly report to the commander of ACC that we had a whole bunch 
of waivers just sitting out here and no one could tell us where they're at.  That led 
to him energizing the staff.” 
Inspector General Personnel 
 IG personnel do not tend to use the information provided in the self-assessment systems 
as a tool to improve 90-201. There are staffs that acknowledge there would be value in analyzing 
those systems to try to find improvements, but with the inspection schedule they find that they 
are undermanned to accomplish those sorts of projects. They do see a difference in AD and 
reserve components in the quality of responses, and they does create a bit of bias at the staff to 
want to try to get more information from the units during their inspection than would be 
normally the case with the information that they have access to virtually. One IGI member 
summed this up this way: 
"It’s not just strictly MICT or IGEMS, because some folks just...the stuff they put 
into MICT is just not very reliable" 
Figure 40 highlights the perception that IG personnel have that their role is to assist 
wings in their operation of AFIS. They believe their role is to provide guidance wherever 
possible to get the commanders intent accomplished through the system. A member of SAF/IG 
stated that their role was to: 
"…provide guidance to the MAJCOMs to ensure that the policy that we're putting 
out meets the intent of SECAF, CSAF, as well as help the MAJCOMS 
commanders to perform their duties." 
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Figure 40 - IG Personnel HHQ Relationship Codes 
Overall 
Continual Evaluation and constant feedback to the unit is a hallmark to AFIS. Based on 
the overall response received from interviewee’s, we can see that the field is communicating up 
the chain as needed. There is strong indication that the IG and staff functionals are not using this 
information to improve policy however. This is based on lack of personnel conducting analysis 
at the staff level, and a general distrust of the information input into the system to begin with.  
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Overview 
Lt Gen Rogers, SAF/IG, stated in the March 12 TIG Brief that: “Adequate assessment 
and reporting without being overly burdensome or disruptive to the organization’s or unit’s 
ability to complete its mission is an important component of a disciplined military force.” 
(Rogers, 2012).With that in mind, understanding whether or not the implementation of AFIS met 
the requirement it was set to accomplish will go a long way in ensuring that our system does all 
that Lt Gen Rogers demanded of the Air Force. The next paragraphs will go into further detail 
the resolution of the investigative questions, recommended actions, further research 
opportunities, and implications.  
Conclusions of Research  
Investigative Questions 1 – How rigorous is AFIS? 
 The rigor provided by AFIS meets the statutory requirement set by AF leaders. Most 
individuals in all stakeholder groups readily admit that there could easily be more rigor provided. 
However, as the primary mission of our squadrons is not to satisfy the IG, most units act in a 
satisficing manner in most cases. There are wide rigor differences detected between active duty 
and guard/reserve units with active duty outperforming the guard/reserves. These differences are 
mostly attributed to lack of experience and different rates of adoption of the culture of 
“operationalizing” the inspection mindset.  
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Investigative Questions 2 – AFIS Meeting Statutory Requirements  
 Title 10’s readiness reporting requirement is not fully met with the input provided by 
AFIS. Most of the readiness data required is still provided by all of the other reporting tools 
(ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, etc.) levied against commanders at all levels. Further, based on 
the delegation of authorities down to Wing commanders, some of our nuclear, biological, and 
chemical warfighting skills have atrophied since the implementation of AFIS. Specifically, as the 
AF has authorized wing commanders to select what mission assurance activities satisfy the AFI 
90-201, Table 5.2 requirement, they have tended to act in that satisficing fashion.  
 Fundamentally, the principle tool used by the MAJCOMs to evaluate Wings is focused 
on non-readiness activities, namely evaluating the wings ability to evaluate itself on compliance 
items. The wing is focused on non-readiness activities, namely the Groups and Squadrons 
abilities to evaluate themselves on compliance items. The net result is there is no product 
generated from the AFIS implementation that addresses our readiness to respond.  
Investigative Questions 3 – Inspection preparation reduction  
 Changing the culture around inspection preparation was an excellent goal put forward by 
SAF/IG in 2012. To date, there is agreement at the squadron and program manager level that 
AFIS has accomplished just that. They readily express that their unit has “embraced the red”, do 
not engage in overt inspection preparation, and have operationalized the AFIS mindset.  
 At the Wing and MAJCOM IG level however, individuals respond that the culture 
change has been very uneven, especially between guard and active duty wings. They view the 
differences in experience being a principle culprit to not embracing the philosophy, but they also 
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believe that the different timelines that each component uses adds to hesitation to adopt the 
mindset.  
Investigative Questions 4 - Commander inspection responsibility and authority   
 AFI 1-2, Commander’s Responsibilities provides that commanders have the legal 
authority and responsibility to inspect their subordinates and subordinate units. A robust 
commander’s inspection program finds deficiencies and improves mission readiness. Part of this 
effort must be a self-assessment program where individual Airmen report their compliance with 
guidance (USAF, 2014). Across all stakeholder groups, there is agreement that AFIS has met this 
goal. Commanders have the tools and expertise available to accomplish a robust inspection 
program. Where the evidence deviates from the views expressed, however, is in the 
implementation. Commanders have the capability to waive off requirements that they view do 
not pay off in terms of mission accomplishment after a risk analysis has been conducted. Of all 
the units interviewed, none had accomplished an analysis of this type, or had plans to. This 
indicates that there is still some education as to what commander’s responsibilities and 
authorities mean.  
Investigative Questions 5 – Improving guidance through AFIS systems 
 The various IT systems utilized by AFIS do provide a capability to provide input into the 
staff as it accomplishes its policy writing mission. Individuals at the squadron and program 
management level don’t see that information being utilized in that fashion, however. Individuals 
at the Wing and IG level believe that the staff cuts at the MAJCOM level prevents Continual 
Evaluation from being accomplished. This results in all that actionable data not being used in 
formulating good policy for the field.  
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Future Research Opportunities 
 This study looked primarily at MXG and MSG type squadrons in ACC and AMC. A 
much wider analysis would be able to detect if these issues are isolated in those 2 commands. 
Additionally, Wing IG personnel were not polled in this study, they could be targeted in future 
research. Further, text mining techniques could be applied to the comments provided in MICT 
and IGEMS to see if there are any trends that would indicate any sorts of undetected 
noncompliance issues.  
Recommended Actions 
 Meeting the intent of the PAD should be the priority for any program that receives tax-
payer funds. In order to meet the readiness reporting deficiencies indicated by this research, the 
AF should begin including a Wing level readiness inspection, either through parts or as a wing as 
a whole, as part of future versions of AFIS. Further, educating commanders at all levels what 
risk-based analysis means when conducting CCIP would pay dividends by providing staffs with 
data on what activities are being waived by the field, and what activities are simply difficult to 
stay in compliance with.  
Part of this study asked interviewees what aspects of AFIS they would change if they 
were in charge of the program. These responses are below in Table 12 in Appendix C, however 
among the more feasible improvements include generating a list of waivers available to wings, 
groups, and squadrons based on mission types. For example, a list of common waivers could be 
provided to Air Base Wing commanders as a potential “menu” of options that the commander 
would apply their judgement and experience against.  
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A separate suggestion was to make the activities to be inspected in table 5.2 of AFI 90-
201 much more tailorable. This would allow MAJCOM IGs to apply their own risk-based 
analysis in determining the composition of the team that gets sent out on inspection and allow for 
better data to be provided to the unit to improve.  
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Appendix A – IRB Exemption Letter 
-
 
87 
 
Appendix B – Initial Interview Guides 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: WING COMMANDER 
Introduction (~3 mins) 
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you 
doing today? 
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is 
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, 
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my 
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would 
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various 
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in 
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok. 
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent: 
• All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially. 
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer. 
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including 
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any 
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from 
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me 
permission to do so.  
• The interview is voluntary, which means: 
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question, 
o And you can stop the interview at any time. 
• I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you.  
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time. 
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally. 
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete. 
Do you have any questions?   (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed. 
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Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes): 
1)  Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus? 
 1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported? 
 1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific 
 1c) The overall budget and size of their operations 
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?  
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
3) How would you describe your wing’s IG role in this area? 
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes): 
 
1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the 
congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these requirements?  
 
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions: 
 
o Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of 
dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, 
major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our 
current system? 
o How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our 
reporting capability? 
 
 
2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount 
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this 
regard? 
 
o Have functionals given you any input into this area? 
o Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS? 
o Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)? 
o Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?  
 
3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to 
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal? 
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o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of 
inspection? 
 
 
4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-
assessments? 
 
o Is it: 
a. Providing in-depth information about the various programs? 
b. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime 
mission? 
c. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you 
think it’s necessary to do this? 
 
 
5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that 
would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?  
 
 
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?  
 
o What’s your rationale for this opinion? 
 
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those 
components for reporting effectiveness?  
 
 
During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the 
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try 
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured. 
• For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”. 
• When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?” 
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure 
their definition of success is outlined). 
• If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of 
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?" 
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• If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How 
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject. 
Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes) 
(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that 
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.) 
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate): 
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of 
reporting effectiveness today?  
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm? 
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, 
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale? 
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system? 
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal 
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.  
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I 
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts 
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?  
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll 
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks 
again! 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: SQUADRON COMMANDER 
Introduction (~3 mins) 
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you 
doing today? 
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is 
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, 
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my 
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would 
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various 
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in 
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok. 
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent: 
• All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially. 
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer. 
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including 
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any 
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from 
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me 
permission to do so.  
• The interview is voluntary, which means: 
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question, 
o And you can stop the interview at any time. 
• I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you.  
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time. 
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally. 
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete. 
Do you have any questions?   (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed. 
Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes): 
92 
 
1)  Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus? 
 1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported? 
 1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific 
 1c) The overall budget and size of their operations 
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?  
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
3) How would you describe your wing’s IG role in this area? 
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes): 
 
1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the 
congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these 
requirements?  
 
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions: 
 
o Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of 
dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, 
major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our 
current system? 
o How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our 
reporting capability? 
 
 
2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount 
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this 
regard? 
 
o Have functionals given you any input into this area? 
o Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS? 
o Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)? 
o Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?  
 
3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to 
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal? 
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o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of 
inspection? 
 
 
4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-
assessments? 
 
o Is it: 
d. Providing in-depth information about the various programs? 
e. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime 
mission? 
f. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you 
think it’s necessary to do this? 
 
 
5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that 
would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?  
 
 
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?  
 
o What’s your rationale for this opinion? 
 
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those 
components for reporting effectiveness?  
 
o How much time do you need to devote to accomplish this? 
 
 
During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the 
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try 
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured. 
• For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”. 
• When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?” 
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure 
their definition of success is outlined). 
• If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of 
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?" 
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• If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How 
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject. 
Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes) 
(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that 
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.) 
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate): 
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of 
reporting effectiveness today?  
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm? 
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, 
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale? 
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system? 
4. How would you change the system? 
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal 
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.  
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I 
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts 
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?  
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll 
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks 
again! 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: PROGRAM MANAGER 
Introduction (~3 mins) 
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you 
doing today? 
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is 
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, 
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my 
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would 
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various 
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in 
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok. 
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent: 
• All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially. 
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer. 
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including 
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any 
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from 
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me 
permission to do so.  
• The interview is voluntary, which means: 
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question, 
o And you can stop the interview at any time. 
• I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you.  
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time. 
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally. 
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete. 
Do you have any questions?   (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed. 
Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes): 
96 
 
1)  Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus? 
 1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported? 
 1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific 
  
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?  
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
3) How would you describe your wing’s IG role in this area? 
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes): 
 
1. Transitioning from the previous inspection model, what were the unexpected 
impediments you faced? Unexpected benefits?  
 
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions: 
 
o Do you feel that training for the self-assessment aspect of CCIP is adequate 
throughout the field? 
o In your self-assessment responses, do you feel they adequately represent the status of 
your program? 
 
 
2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount 
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this 
regard? 
 
o Have functionals given you any input into this area? 
o Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS? 
o Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)? 
o Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?  
 
3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to 
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal? 
 
o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of 
inspection? 
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4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-
assessments? 
 
o Is it: 
g. Providing in-depth information about the various programs? 
h. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime 
mission? 
i. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you 
think it’s necessary to do this? 
 
 
5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that 
would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?  
 
 
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?  
 
o What’s your rationale for this opinion? 
 
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those 
components for reporting effectiveness?  
 
 
During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the 
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try 
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured. 
• For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”. 
• When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?” 
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure 
their definition of success is outlined). 
• If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of 
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?" 
• If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How 
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject. 
Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes) 
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(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that 
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.) 
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate): 
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of 
reporting effectiveness today?  
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm? 
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or, 
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale? 
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system? 
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal 
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.  
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I 
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts 
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?  
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll 
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks 
again! 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: INSPECTOR GENERAL 
Introduction (~3 mins) 
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you 
doing today? 
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is 
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness, 
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my 
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would 
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various 
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in 
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok. 
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent: 
• All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially. 
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer. 
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including 
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any 
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from 
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me 
permission to do so.  
• The interview is voluntary, which means: 
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question, 
o And you can stop the interview at any time. 
• I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you.  
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time. 
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally. 
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete. 
Do you have any questions?   (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed. 
Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes): 
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1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus? 
 2a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported? 
 2b) Where they operate – regional or country specific 
 2c) The overall budget and size of their operations 
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in this area?  
4a) As a authority for assessment?  
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas? 
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes): 
 
1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the 
congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these 
requirements?  
 
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions: 
 
o Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of 
dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment, 
major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our 
current system? 
o How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our 
reporting capability? 
 
 
2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount 
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this 
regard? 
 
o Have functional given you any input into this area? 
o Has your travel workload diminished as a result of AFIS? 
o Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)? 
o Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?  
 
3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to 
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal? 
 
o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of 
inspection? 
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4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-
assessments? 
 
o Is it: 
j. Providing in-depth information about the various programs? 
k. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime 
mission? 
l. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you 
think it’s necessary to do this? 
 
 
5. In developing policy solutions for the field, how frequently do you turn to system data in 
MICT or IGEMS to assist?  
 
o What are reasons that you do or do not rely on self-assessment comments or IGEMS 
data? 
 
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?  
 
o What’s your rationale for this opinion? 
 
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those 
components for reporting effectiveness?  
 
 
During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the 
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try 
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured. 
• For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”. 
• When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?” 
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure 
their definition of success is outlined). 
• If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of 
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?" 
• If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How 
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject. 
Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes) 
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(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that 
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.) 
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of
reporting effectiveness today?
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or,
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal 
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.  
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll 
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks 
again! 
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Appendix C – Tables 
Table 12 – Recommendations for AFIS improvement from field 
Program 
Manager 
The only way to get a 100% assessment of how our units are operating would be to 
do some sort of no-notice, like preinspection or something. 
Program 
Manager 
I feel that the Air Force Task List needs to be integrated into the communicators in 
a way that gets at the capability of the unit, and not the compliance situation.  
Squadron 
Commander 
The communicators should be much more detailed beyond the requirements in the 
AFI. They also feel that reverting to a semiannual requirement to report on self-
assessments would increase the rigor of the system.  
Squadron 
Commander 
If I Were King for the day I would take a look at the inspection checklist 
themselves to make sure that they are viable, their value added, and making sure 
that we need to have that many questions. I understand that certain programs and 
may dictate that like PRP or something like that, but there are certain programs 
that I know if you have a 50-question MICT checklist that you can answer and 
Ensure that you're in compliance with 10, that's what I would look I would try to 
get that scrub down. 
Wing 
Commander 
Here's an example, we were trying to determine what waivers to put forward and 
we asked the question: why do we need to even invent this? Why don't we try what 
all the air base wings in the Air Force are putting in for waivers?  We should be 
able to hit a button and get a list Instead of waiting for a good idea person to we 
should wave this we should wave that. Also, the program ought to be able to hit a 
button and get what all the issue areas are that wings like you have. Instead you 
have to try to get you UEI reports, dig through those reports and see if any of them 
apply to you. It would seem to me that this program ought to be able to do cross 
organizational analysis better than what it does. 
IG Personnel 
I would make Attachment 3 much more tailorable to the MAJCOM, instead of the 
you must do this and you must do it all in the inspectable UEI period. In fact we're 
trying to get GO support on this.  
IG Personnel 
I would make the wing it position a post Squadron command vectored position as a 
matter of development. The way we manage our IG’s so that you have a person 
that's walked a mile in my shoes, has run a unit self-assessment program, and 
understands the challenges associated with that, and can be a mentor to in addition 
to providing validation to Squadron self-assessor programs.  He’d be a peer mentor 
to those Squadron Commanders as opposed to how it typically is done as someone 
who's on the path to retirement, which was the old system, or now it's seems to be 
gaining some traction where it's done pre-command for someone who is of 
command caliber, who’s likely to go to command as a sort of spin up.  I think you 
get more out of it if you do it after the command experience. 
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